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INTRODUCTION

During its 1994 term, the Federal Circuit considered a variety of tax
issues, including the taxability of punitive damage awards under
section 104(a) (2) ,' the tax treatment of tort liability settlement fund
contributions, 2 the validity of a U.S.-Puerto Rico withholding agree-

* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
1. See Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 230 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (examining statutory
language of I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), which excludes compensation for injuries and sickness from
income, to determine whether punitive damages received on account of personal injuries are
excludable).
2. See Maxus Energy Corp. v. United States, 31 F.3d 1135, 1142-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(using "all events" test to determine whether taxpayer is entitled to current deduction).
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ment for federal wages,' and the taxability of a federal judge's
disability retirement payments. 4 This Article reviews and discusses
those decisions with a view toward their overall importance and
precedential impact. Although the Federal Circuit, as a refund
jurisdiction, hears far fewer tax cases in a term than does the United
States Tax Court, the cases it hears are often of particular significance, import, and dollar value. This certainly proved true in 1994.
I.

TAX SHELTERS

The Federal Circuit heard two tax shelter cases in 1994, far fewer
than in prior years. The first case, TranspacDrilling Venture v. United
States,5 discussed who may serve as a tax matters partner under
§ 6231(a) (7).6 The second case, Mulholland v. United States,7 discussed use of the Rule of 78's accounting method in computing
interest deductions. The Federal Circuit decided both cases for the
Government.
Transpac Drilling Ventures (TDVs) was a series of seventy-three tax
shelter limited partnerships formed to acquire interests in oil and gas
properties.' The Government began a civil audit of some of the
partnerships in 1983 and then extended its examination to criminal
investigations in 1985, 1986, and 1987. Douglas Adams was a tax
matters partner (TMP) for many of the TDV partnerships.' 0 In 1987
Adams pled guilty to criminal tax charges arising from his promotion-

3. See Romero v. United States, 38 F.3d 1204, 1207-12 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (determining
validity of U.S.-Puerto Rico agreement withholding income tax from federal employees).
4. See Kane v. United States, 43 F.3d 1446, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (considering whether
disability retirement payments received byjudges under 28 U.S.C. § 372(a) are excludable from
gross income under § 104(a) (2)).
5. 16 F.3d 383 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denip 115 S. Ct. 79 (1994).
6. See I.R.C. § 6231(a) (7) (1988) (defining tax matters partners as (a) general partners
designated as tax matters partners as provided in regulations, or (b) if no partners are so
designated, general partners with largest profits in partnership at close of taxable year). Note
that all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, unless otherwise noted.
The I.R.C. may be found at 26 U.S.C.
7. 22 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
8. See Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States, 67 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1994-26
(Jan. 24, 1994) (relating history of TDV's formation).
9. See Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States, 16 F.3d 383, 385 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. C. 79 (1994). Under the statutory scheme created by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, I.R.C. §§ 6221-6233 (1988), audits of partnerships are conducted
(other than for certain small partnerships) at the partnership level. See id. § 6221 (describing
tax treatment of partnerships); id. § 6231(1) (B) (excluding partnerships of 10 or fewer partners
from definition of partnership under § 6221).
10. Transpar, 16 F.3d at 385. Partnerships must designate a tax matters partner who is
responsible for overseeing an audit and keeping all partners notified of its progress. I.R.C.
§ 6223(g) (1988).
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al activities with respect to various TDV partnerships.11 Notwithstanding Adams' plea, the IRS, which was not a party to the plea
arrangements, continued to treat Adams as the TMP, and in this
capacity, the IRS sent copies of Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustments (FPAAs) for several of the partnerships to Adams in
1989.12

Adams resigned as TMP from all of the TDV partnerships in
January 1990, without filing a petition for readjustment of any FPAA
in any court. 3 In his statement of resignation, Adams appointed
three limited partners as general partners "for the limited purpose of
serving as TMP" for the involved TDV partnerships. 4 A majority of
the limited partners in the partnerships subsequently ratified these
appointments. 5 A designated limited partner of each partnership
filed a readjustment petition in the Court of Federal Claims (Claims
Court) in February 1990, which was within the ninety-day period
following issuance of the FPAA.' 6 After the ninety-day period
partners filed timely petitions in the United
expired, other limited
7
Court.
Tax
States
The Government moved to dismiss the actions in the Claims Court
for lack ofjurisdiction, arguing that a petition to review a FPAA must
be filed by a TMP within the ninety-day period following its issue, and
none of the limited partners was a TMP.'8 The Claims Court
granted the motion to dismiss.' 9
In Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States,2 ° the Federal Circuit
upheld the Claims Court's dismissal." The court explained that
limited partners cannot be TMPs under §§ 6231 (a) (7) (A) and (B),

11. See Transpa, 16 F.3d at 385 (stating that Adams pled guilty to conspiracy and aiding and
abetting investment counselor fraud).
12. See id. (concluding that because IRS was not party to plea agreement, it was free to
pursue any lawful claims against Adams).
13. 1&LIf the IRS believes adjustments are appropriate at the conclusion of an audit, it will
issue an FPAA to the TMP and all partners who are entitled to notice under § 6223(a). I.R.C.
§ 6223(d) (2) (1988). The TMP then has 90 days to file a petition challenging the FPAA in the
Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims or appropriate District Court. Id. § 6223(a). If the TMP
does not file within 90 days, any notice partner can file a readjustment petition within the next
60 days in any one of these courts. Id. § 6223(b) (1).
14. Transpm 16 F.3d at 386.
15. 1& (noting that partners accepted appointments on April 9, 1990).
16.

Id.

17. d. Rules determine jurisdictional priority if more than one petition is filed. I.R.C. §§
6223(b) (2)-(4) (1988).
18. SeeTranspac Drilling Venture v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1245, 1249 (1992) (rejecting
plaintiffs request for court appointment of TMP), af'd, 16 F.3d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
19.

IX.

20. 16 F.3d 383 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 79 (1994).
21. Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States, 16 F.3d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir.), ced. denied 115
S. Ct. 79 (1994).
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which require TMPs be general partners. 22 None of TDVs' filing
partners were general partners because none of them assumed
unlimited partnership liability.23 The court held that the limited
partners could not be general partners solely to serve as TMP, without
assuming all the rights and liabilities of general partners. 24 Accordingly, at the time of filing, or at any time within the ninety-day period
reserved for the TMP to file a readjustment petition, no qualified
TMP had filed a petition in this case.2
Taxpayers argued that the court had the authority and therefore
should sua sponte appoint the filing partner as the TMP, 26 citing the
IRS's authority to appoint a limited partner as TMP in certain
circumstances.2 7 Taxpayers also argued that § 6231 (a) (7) should
control only the administrative, not the judicial, stage of the proceeding.28 Once litigation has begun, taxpayers argued, partnerships
should be able to choose any TMP to represent them in court
proceedings. 29 Finally, the plaintiff taxpayers argued that failure to
allow limited partners to serve as TMPs in these cases would impair
their due process right to proceed in their forum of choice."0
The Federal Circuit, however, was unpersuaded by the taxpayers'
argument, and concluded that the Claims Court had properly held
jurisdiction that had not been established by either an individual or
entity TMP.3' The court declined the taxpayers' invitation to
appoint a limited partner as TMP, stating that while the IRS had the
authority to appoint a limited partner as TMP, it had not done so in
this case. 2 The court disposed of plaintiffs' due process argument
by viewing the case as a simple choice of forum question, and holding
that, although taxpayers would prefer to litigate in the Claims Court,
their due process rights would not be violated by requiring them to

22.

IX. at 388.

23. See id. (stating that plaintiffs "agreed to be limited partners for the limited purpose only
of serving as the TMP," not to assume unlimited liability).
24.
25.

Id.
Id.

26. Id (explaining taxpayer's assertion that filing partners should be appointed TMPs
because large percentage of partners agreed to this in vote taken after filing).
27.

See id.

28. See id. (noting plaintiffs' argument that temporary regulations do not control once FPAA
has been issued to partnership).
29. See id. (explaining plaintiffs' argument that all partnerships are required to have TMPs
for judicial proceedings).
30. See id. at 390 (dismissing plaintiffs' argument that IRS should not be allowed to
designate its opponents' representative or to leave opponent without one).
31.

Id

32. See id. at 388 (explaining that IRS was unaware ofAdams' resignation until after subject
petitions were filed and had, therefore, not designated new TMP).
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proceed in the Tax Court.3 The decision of the Federal Circuit did
not conclude the litigation in this case, but merely shifted the forum
to the Tax Court.
In Mulholland v. United States,' the taxpayers were limited partners
of a partnership, Quincy Associates, Ltd." In 1980 Quincy purchased a shopping center in Quincy, Florida with a $192,000 cash
deposit. The company financed the balance of the purchase price
with a $7.3 million twenty-three year nonrecourse note ($2.8 million
in principal and $5 million in interest).6 The note stated no
interest rate. The interest could, however, be prepaid, and if the
taxpayers elected to do so, interest to date could be computed using
the Rule of 78's accounting method. 7 On its 1981 and 1982
partnership tax returns, Quincy reported and deducted accrued
interest under the Rule of 78's, and the Mulhollands claimed their
pass through share on their individual tax returns for those years.3"
The Rule of 78's is an accounting method whereby the total interest
to be paid under an installment contract is determined under the
sum-of-the-years-digits formula.3 9 The Rule of 78's method allows a
significant acceleration of interest deductions to the early years of the
loan.4" The IRS in Revenue Ruling 83-8441 disallowed use of the
Rule of 78's method, which had been used principally by tax shelter
partnerships, and in Revenue Procedure 84-2842 created procedures
to change from the Rule of 78's to a proper accounting method. 3
After auditing the partnership return in this case, the IRS concluded that the partnership's use of the Rule of 78's did not "clearly

33. Id. at 390.
34. 22 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff'g28 Fed. Cl. 320 (1993).
35. Mulholland v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 320, 322 (1993).
36. See id. at 325 (detailing financial aspects of transaction).
37. Id.
38. See hi (noting Quincy's allocation of interest expenses pursuant to Rule of 78's method
of accounting, although no prepayments were made during 1981 or 1982).
39. See Mulholland v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 748, 750 n.4 (1992) (explaining Rule of 78's
allocation method, which multiplies total amount of loan's interest by number of remaining
months to maturity divided by sum of months in original term).
40. Se. Walter C. Cliff & PhilipJ. Levine, InterestAeerual and the Time Value of Money, 35 AM.
U. L. REV. 107, 110 (1985) (explaining that, in early years, Rule of 78's deductions exceed those
resulting from straight-line or constant interest accounting method).
41. 1983-1 C.B. 97 (1983).
42. 1984-1 C.B. 475 (1984).
43. See id. (outlining procedure to apply to lenders and borrowers in violation of Rev. Rul.
83-84, which disallowed Rule of 78's accounting). See generally George Cooper, The Taming of the
Shrewd: Identifying and ControllingIncome Tax Avoidance 85 COLUM. L. Rhv. 657, 687-88 (1985)
(describing effects of Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 on curbing deductions accelerated by
prepayments); Cliff& Levine, supra note 40, at 110 (explaining generally use of Rule of 78's as
accrual method to achieve favorable tax treatment)..
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reflect income" under § 446(b)," and required the partnership to
use the economic accrual method in reporting its interest expense. 5
Although the years in issue preceded the issuance of Revenue Ruling
83-84, the IRS disallowed the portion of the interest expense claimed
that exceeded the amount allowable under the economic accrual
46
method of accounting.
The Claims Court upheld the Government's position,4" and the
Federal Circuit affirmed.
Both courts held that the Government
did not abuse its discretion in requiring Quincy to change its
accounting method for interest deductions beginning with the tax
year 1981 because of the distortive effect caused by the Rule of
78's. 41 Under that method, the court stated, the partnership was
paying an effective interest rate of 18.8% at the beginfiing of the loan
and 0.5% at the end. ° The court concluded that market forces or
general business conditions are not relevant to reporting interest
accruals in this manner.5 ' The partnership was not obligated to
make interest payments consistent with the Rule of 78's except in the
event of a prepayment, and no prepayment occurred here.5"
The court further held that the taxpayers were not entitled to use
the change in accounting procedures described in Revenue Procedure
84-28, which would have given them relief by allocating the adjustment amount over a multi-year period, because they had failed to file
Form 3115, as required by that Revenue Procedure.55

44. Mulholland v. United States, No. 93-5158, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5109, at *'1(Fed. Cir.
Mar. 18, 1994); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 446(b) (1988) (stating that taxpayers' accounting methods must
clearly reflect income).
45. See Mulholland, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5109, at *2 (affirming trial court's holding that
IRS did not abuse discretion in ordering Quincy to change its method of calculating interest).
46. See id. (affirming trial court's determination that Quincy was not entitled to benefits of
Revenue Procedure 84-28, which outlined procedures for changing from Rule of 78's to proper
accounting method).
47. Mulholland v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 320,340 (1993) (sustaining IRS conclusion that
Quincy should switch from Rule of 78's to economic accrual method of accounting).
48. See Mulholland4 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5109, at *2 (disallowingplaintiffs' use ofRevenue
Procedure 84-28 to unilaterally change its accounting methods).
49. Id. at *8 (concluding that Quincy's use of Rule of 78's on long-term note resulted in
improper bunching of disproportionate amount of interest to early years with negligible
amounts in later years).
50. Id.
51. See id. at *9 (stating that determining amount of interest pursuant to Rule of 78's does
not take into consideration market interest rate, transaction risks or inflation).
52. Id. at *7.
53. See i. at *12 (requiring filing of Form 3115 for changing accrual method without IRS
Commissioner's permission).
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The Federal Circuit's decision in Mulholland is consistent with a
factually similar4 case decided by the Tax Court and affirmed by the
5

Third Circuit.

II. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
In addition to Transpac Drilling Venture v. United States, discussed
above,55 the Federal Circuit considered three other cases involving
jurisdictional issues.
In Chicago Milwaukee Corp. v. United States,5" the court considered
what an employer must do to establish jurisdiction in the Claims
Courtin order to claim a refund of taxes paid under the employee
The
portion of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA).5 7
RRTA 8 tax is similar to the Federal Insurance Contribution Act tax
(FICA), 59 in that it is shared between employer and employee.'
The employer withholds the employee portion from wages and remits
both the employee and employer portion to the Government"
The taxpayer in this case, Chicago Milwaukee Corporation (CMC),
was the successor in interest to a bankrupt railroad corporation.62
Following a sale of the railroad corporation's assets, CMC concluded
that it was no longer an employer for RRTA purposes and sought a
refund of RRTA taxes paid.6 3
Section 7422 (a) of the tax code requires taxpayers wishing to bring
refund claims before the Claims Court and federal district courts, to
file a refund claim with the IRS prior to bringing the action.' The
refund claim must comply with all IRS regulations and must apprise

54. See Prabel v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1101 (1988), affid, 882 F.2d 820, 826-27 (3d Cir.
1989) (disallowing plaintiff's use of Rule of 78's to calculate interest deductions because it did
not result in clear reflection of income).
55. Se supranotes 8-33 and accompanying text.
56. 40 F.3d 373 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
57. Chicago Milwaukee Corp. v. United States, 40 F.3d 373,374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing
court's lack ofjurisdiction over Chicago Milwaukee Corporation's refund request based on fact
that corporation did not certify, as required by IRS, that it had repaid its employees or obtained
their consent to seek refund).
58. I.R.C. §§ 3201-3233 (1988).
59. 35 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988).
60. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988) (creating federal income tax) and 35 U.S.C. § 3111
(1988) (creating federal employer excise tax) with 35 U.S.C. § 3201 (1988) (creating federal tax
on employee incomes) and 35 U.S.C. § 3221 (1988) (creating federal excise tax).
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 3202 (1988) (stating that employers shall collect federal income tax
created by § 3201, by deducting appropriate amounts from employee paychecks).
62. Chicago Milwaukee Corp. v. United States, 40 F.3d 373, 374 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
63. See id. (discussing CMC's conclusion that RRTA did not apply to distributions made).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1988) (stating that taxpayers cannot file suit for tax refunds
prior to filing refund claim with IRS).
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the IRS of the factual and legal basis for the claim.' Without this
administrative filing, the refund court has no jurisdiction over a
subsequent claim.'
Under RRTA regulations, 67 employers who seek a refund of the
employee portion of RRTA taxes must certify that they have repaid
the tax to their employees or obtained their consent to bring the
refund action.' The question presented in this case concerned the
timing requirement of certification.69
The Federal Circuit held that despite CMC's failure to certify and
obtain its employees' consent to the refund action in this case, the
Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. 70 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that, although certification is required, there is no
requirement that a claim for refund must include certification when
filed. 71 The Federal Circuit construed § 7422(a) as a notice provision that informs the IRS Commissioner of the asserted grounds of a
refund claim before an action is filed 72 The certification requirement, on the other hand, prevents an employer from reaping a
windfall at the expense of its employees.7' Accordingly, certification
can occur at any time before the refund is made. 74 In Chicago
Milwaukee Corp., the court held that requiring CMC to compensate
8000 former employees or obtain their consent before filing an action
would constitute an unreasonable burden.7 5
In Estate of Akin v. United States,76 the Federal Circuit held that the
Court of Federal Claims had properly applied the full payment rule
of Flora v. United States,77 which requires that all outstanding tax
deficiencies be paid in full prior to bringing refund actions in the
Claims Court.7 Because deficiencies were unpaid at the time the
65. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977) (disallowing refunds unless
claim sets forth detailed grounds for refund).
66. See ChicagoMilwaukee Corp., 40 F.3d at 374 (stating that filing refund requirement with
IRS is jurisdictional prerequisite to refund suit) (citations omitted).
67. Treas. Reg. § 31.6402(a) (2) (1994).
68. See id. (explaining requirements).
69. See Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 40 F.3d at 375 (stating that Treasury regulations do not
impose certification deadlines).
70. See i&. at 374 (reversing and remanding Claims Court dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction).
71. See id. at 375 (noting that Treasury regulations neither require nor prohibit inclusion
of certification at time of filing).
72. Id. at 374.
73. I. at 374-75.
74. Id. at 375.
75. See id. at 376 (describing dismissal of CMC's claim as harsh and "without good reason").
76. 43 F.3d 1487 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
77. 357 U.S. 63 (1958), affld on reh'g, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960).
78. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 74-75 (1958) (explaining legislative history of
pay first and litigate later" principle); Estate ofAkin v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 89, 93 (1994)
(upholding jurisdictional grant to Claims Court in tax refund cases only when taxpayer, prior
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Claims Court petition was filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim.7 9
Additionally, in Sceili v. United Statess the Federal Circuit stated
that the Claims Court had properly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear a complaint seeking a refund of interest on a tax
deficiency."1 Although § 6404(e) gives the Commissioner authority
to abate interest in certain circumstances, 2 the Commissioner's
failure to exercise that authority in this instance was discretionary and
not subject to judicial review. 3
III.

PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS

In Reese v. United States, 4 the Federal Circuit considered the case
of Elizabeth Reese, who won ajury award of $140,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages in connection with a
lawsuit brought against her former employer for sex discrimination,
sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
She won an additional $10,000 for breach of contract and $239,437.01
in attorney's fees.86 Reese initially reported the punitive damages
portion of the award as taxable income, but later filed an amended
return treating the punitive damages as excludable from income
under § 104(a) (2).7 When her claim for refund was denied by the
IRS, Reese filed a refund suit in the Claims Court.'
On cross motions for summary judgment, the Claims Court
concluded that punitive damages are taxable and granted the

to commencement of refund suit, has fully paid all outstanding tax deficiencies for taxable year
at issue).
79. See Estate of Akin v. United States, No. 94-5117, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35547, at *2
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 1994) (finding no error in dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction). For a recent
exposition on the "full payment rule" by the Federal Circuit, see Rocovich v. United States, 933
F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding determination that THra requires full payment of
estate tax before commencing refund suit).
80. 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
81. Sceili v. United States, No. 94-5101, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29310, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct.
14, 1994).
82. SeeI.R.C. § 6404(e) (1988) (giving IRS power to abate assessment of interest attributable
to IRS errors and delays).
83. See Sceii, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29310, at *5 (using statutory language to reach
conclusion that authority of IRS to abate interest is discretionary).
84. 20 Fed. CI. 702 (1993), afT'd, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
85. Reese v. United States, 20 Fed. Cl. 702, 703 (1993), at'td, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
86. d.
87. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988) (providing that damages received on account of personal
injuries are not included in gross income).
88. Id.
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Government's motion. 9 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims
Court's holding."
Section 104(a) (2) provides that gross income does not include "the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness." 9' The issue of whether punitive
damages received in a personal injury suit are excludable from
income under § 104(a) (2)--or whether that section is limited to
compensatory damages-has been litigated extensively. To date, the
Tax Court9 2 and the Sixth Circuit 3 have lined up on the taxpayer's
side, holding that § 104(a) (2) excludes all damages received in
connection with a personal injury suit, including punitive damages.9 4
These courts interpreted the language of the statute, which excludes
from income "any damages received ... on account of personal
injuries," to require only an evaluation of the nature of the underlying claim.95 If the claim involves a tort-like personal injury,95 all
damages received in connection with it are excludable.9
The Fourth,9" Ninth,' and now the Federal Circuit,"° as well

89. See id at 711 (holding that punitive damages fall outside exclusion from taxable gross
income set forth in I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)).
90. Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
91. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
92. See Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330, 335 (1989), re'd,914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that settlement proceeds of Maryland lawsuits for defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress are not subject to federal income tax).
93. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 625-26 (6th Cir. 1994), affg 100 T.C. 93
(1993) (excluding taxpayer's punitive damages under § 104(a) (2)).
94. Horton, 33 F.3d at 629-31 (explaining that damages described in compensatory terms
that are not excludable from income under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (1988) are often larger than
amount necessary to reimburse actual monetary loss sustained, and should instead be
categorized as excludable damages received on account of personal injuries).
95. Miller, 93 T.C. at 335-38 (emphasis added).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970) provides:
Section 104(a) (2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term
"damages received (whether by suit or agreement)" means an amount received (other
than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based
upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu
of such prosecution.

Id.

97. See Horton, 33 F.3d at 629 (explaining plaintiffs burden of proof to show that recovery
redresses tort-like personal injury and arguing therefore that such recovery should be excluded
from income).
98. See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586,589 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting conclusion that
plain meaning of § 104(a) (2) compels exclusion of punitive damages from gross income).
99. See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that no valid
reason existed to exempt punitive award from taxation).
100. See Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding that because
punitive damages are not received on account of personal injury as defined by Tax Code, they
are not excludable from income under § 104(a) (2)).
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as several lower courts," have interpreted § 104(a) (2) in favor of
the Government. These courts have held that punitive damages are
not within the exclusion of§ 104(a) (2) because they are not awarded
"on account of" personal injuries of the plaintiff0 2 Rather, punitive
grossly negligent behavior
damages are imposed to punish tortfeasors'
10 3
and to deter such conduct in others.
The Federal Circuit in Reese looked to the legislative history of
§ 104(a) (2) to conclude that the taxpayer's punitive damages were
not paid on account of her personal injury. The legislative history
indicates that Congress did not intend to exclude punitive damages
from gross income. 4 The court concluded that Congress enacted
§ 104(a) (2) to ensure that payments representing only recovery of a
loss, or return of personal capital, would not be taxed. 5 Because
punitive damages are not a return of capital but windfalls to the
taxpayer and clear economic accessions to wealth, the court reasoned
that it would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose to exclude
06
them.
It is noteworthy that Congress amended § 104(a)(2) in 1989,
specifically to exclude punitive damage awards received "in connec"1 °7
tion with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness
from the section's scope. The amendment applies, for example, to
damages in employment discrimination, defamation, or harassment
suits, much like Reese. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit's opinion in
Reese is consistent with the statutory rule now in place for cases
involving nonphysical injuries."° It is unclear whether the 1989
legislative amendment creates a negative inference and would
therefore exclude punitive damages from income in cases involving

101. See, ag., Estate of Wesson v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
(finding that net punitive damages are taxable accession of wealth to plaintiff); Rice v. United
States, 834 F. Supp. 1241, 1246 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that punitive damages awarded under
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are taxable income); Kemp v. Commissioner,
771 F. Supp. 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that punitive damages awarded in civil rights
action constitute gross income).
102. See Reee. 24 F.3d at 230-31 (discussing decisions finding punitive damages taxable).
103. See i& (explaining Government position that punitive damages are awarded not because
of personal injury but because of defendants' "egregious conduct").
104. Md

105. See i. (stating that damages excludable under § 104(a) (2) encompass only damages
resulting from injury or sickness).
106. I. at 231-32.
107. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

108. See Ree

24 F.3d at 235 (upholding inclusion in gross income of punitive damages not

received on account of personal injury within the meaning of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). The court
in Re=e also noted that cases excluding punitive damages from gross income are based on an
IRS revenue ruling that has since been revoked. Id.
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physical injuries. One author has argued in the negative," 9 but no
court has ruled on the issue to date.
In Reese, the Federal Circuit also noted that when a statute allowing
an exemption from income is ambiguous and susceptible to two
interpretations, it should be narrowly construed in light of the overall
purpose of the income tax laws, which is to raise revenue."'
The punitive damages issue involved in Reese is only one of several
interpretative issues that have arisen under § 104(a) (2) in the last
several years. In 1992, the Supreme Court considered this statute in
Burke v. United States,"' which discussed the excludability of a back
pay award in a sex discrimination suit under the pre-1991 version of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'12 The Court held that for
§ 104(a) (2) to apply, the underlying claim must involve a tort-like
injury, a hallmark of which is the availability of a broad range of
damages, including punitive or exemplary damages in those instances
where the defendant's misconduct is intentional or reckless. 13 In
Burke, the Court determined that the pre-1991 Title VII' did not
provide such a broad range of damages, but, to the contrary, limited
the plaintiffs recovery to back pay and injunctive relief."15 The
Court concluded that Title VII recovery in this case was not "on
account of personal injury" within the meaning of § 104(a) (2) and
was therefore taxable."'
In addition to Burke, a number of recent cases" 7 have addressed
the excludability of damages (including liquidated damages) received
by plaintiffs in connection with age discrimination actions under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." 8 In February

109. See Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of PunitiveDamages Obtained in a Personal Injury Claim, 65
TAX NOTEs 487, 490 (1994) (stating that 1989 amendment has no bearing on excludability of
punitive damages connected with physical injury).
110. See id. (noting that long-standing precedent favors inclusion of all accessions to wealth
in gross income).
111. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
112. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
113. See Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229, 234-37 (1992) (explaining personal injury
victim's range of recoverable damages under state law).
114. Congress has since amended Title VII to permit jury trials, as well as compensatory and
punitive damage awards for Title VII actions. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
115. Burke, 504 U.S. at 239-40.
116. Id. at 241-42.
117. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 1994) (excluding from
gross income liquidated damages collected on account of personal injury); Downey v.
Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836,840 (7th Cir. 1994) (including in gross income liquidated damages
collected under ADEA); Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119, 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding

that damages are excludable from gross income), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
118.

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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1994, the Claims Court decided Bennett v. United States."9 The court
found the ADEA award nontaxable under § 104(a) (2) 2 Due to
a conflict among the circuits,121 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Schlier v. Commissione to resolve the issue. In June 1995,
the Supreme Court held that the ADEA recovery (both back pay and
liquidated damages portions) were not excludable from gross
income."
The Federal Circuit thereafter reversed the Claims
Court's decision in Bennett, based on Schleier."
In Schleier, the Supreme Court described the ADEA liquidated
damages as "punitive in nature.""
Based on this description of
liquidated damages and its holding that the liquidated damages were
not excludable under § 104(a) (2),26 the Court's opinion strongly
suggests that punitive damages can never be excluded under
§ 104(a) (2) and that Reese was correctly decided.
IV. DISABILrIY RETIREMENT PAYMENTS
The Federal Circuit made another foray into § 104 in 1994. In
Kane v. United States,I" the taxpayer was a federal judge who retired
from the bench in 1988 after being diagnosed with stress-related sleep
apnea. 28 The taxpayer sought to exclude the disability payments he
received in connection with this condition from his taxable income
under § 104(a) (1), 1 which excludes from income "amounts
received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness.""3' The taxpayer's position was that
the statute under which he received his disability payments was "in the
nature of a workman's compensation act" because payments were
provided for a work-related injury.'

119. 80 Fed. Cl. 896 (1994).
120. See Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 396,399-401 (1994) (finding damages awarded
under ADEA excludable because ADEA redresses tort-like personal injuries).

121. See supra note 117 (citing cases that indicate differences among circuits in their
treatment of ADEA damage awards).
122. 115 S.Ct. 507 (1994).
123. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
124. Bennett v. United States, No. 94-5117, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (Fed. Cir.July 10,
1995).
125. Schier,115 S.Ct. at 2165.
126. Id at 2167.
127. 43 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
128. Kane v. United States, 43 F.3d 1446, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
129. See id. at 1448 (detailing arguments that taxpayer set forth in amended tax returns).
130. I.RC. § 104(a)(1) (1988).
131. Kane, 43 F.3d at 1449.
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Both the Claims Court'12 and the Federal Circuit disagreed with
the taxpayer's position. In a decision the Federal Circuit described
as one of first impression,' the court reasoned that workmen's
compensation statutes provide payments to employees in cases
involving employment-related accidents and diseases, regardless of
employer fault.'
Accordingly, they could be considered no-fault
substitutes for compensation that the employee might have received
based on a theory of employer liability."
This case, however,
involved the taxpayer's retirement plan, which was not concerned with
employer liability.'36 The retirement plan provided for a continuation of salary and benefits in an amount tied to the taxpayer's length
of service as a judge.'3 7 As such, the plan did not relieve the
Government of any liability it might otherwise be exposed to as a
result of the taxpayer's disability."a For this reason, the court found
the compensation plan very different from a workman's compensation
statute, and the taxpayer's disability payments were, accordingly, not
excludable under § 104(a) (1).119
In holding against the taxpayer, the court also referred to a
Treasury Regulation, section 1.104-1 (b), which states that "§ 104(a) (1)
does not apply to a retirement pension or annuity to the extent that
it is determined by reference to the employee's age or length of
service... even though the employee's retirement is occasioned by
an occupation injury or sickness.""4
V. FICA WITHHOLDING REQUIRED
In Euken v. Department of Health and Human Services, 4' Corey
Euken suffered a residual seizure disorder, developmental delays, and
mental disabilities in reaction to DPT shots for diphtheria, pertussis,
and tetanus."4 Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986,14 Corey petitioned for and received a compensation award

132. See Kane v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 10, 14 (1993) (holding that disability retirement
payments were not in nature of workmen's compensation act).
133. Kane, 43 F.3d at 1448.
134. Id at 1449.
135. Md
136. ld
137. See id. (explaining that disability retirement provision suppbrted continuation of either
full or half salary, depending on tenure).
138. Id
139.

See id

140.
141.
142.
143.

Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(b) (as amended in 1970).
34 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Euken v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 F.3d 1045, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (1988).
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for his injuries, as determined by a Special Master.1" As part of the
award, he received compensation for loss of earning capacity pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (3) (B).' 4 This statute allows a lost
earnings award calculated on the basis of average gross weekly
earnings of workers in the private, non-farm sector, less appropriate
taxes.14 ' The Special Master determined the award amount after
deducting an amount equal to income taxes payable on the earnings,
but did not deduct FICA tax in the computation. 47 The Special
Master reasoned that FICA was not an appropriate tax because the
taxpayer would not, as a normally employed person would, receive the
FICA tax once he attained the age of sixty-five.'4
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the Special Master's analysis.
The court stated that under the statutory scheme, FICA is an
appropriate tax if a private sector worker would normally deduct FICA
from their average gross weekly earnings.149 The court concluded
that, while narrow exceptions do exist, in most cases, private sector
workers pay FICA taxes on their wages." The court determined
that the particular work status of the beneficiary in this instance was
irrelevant, because the rule to deduct the FICA tax is an objective and
not a subjective one.' 5 '
Although the scope and breadth of the FICA tax base continues to
be an important question, for example, in the employee-independent
contractor context, 52 the facts of Euken are so unusual that the
court's decision in that case is likely to have little precedential impact.
VI.

RESPONSIBLE PERSON PENALTY UPHELD

An employer is required to withhold federal income and FICA taxes
from employees, hold them in trust, and pay them to the IRS.'

144. See Euken, 34 F.3d at 1046 (stating that, after filing petition for compensation under
Vaccine Act, Special Master determines entitlement and amount of award).
145. I(L at 1046-47.

146. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a) (3) (B) (1988).
147. See Euken, 34 F.3d at 1047 (noting Special Master's determination that beginningin year
2007, average annual earnings for 40-hour work week would total $28,715.58).
148. I/
149. I& at 1048.

150.

I.

151.

1&

152. See, eg., Louis Lyons, CongressionalCampaignWorkers: IndependentContractorsorEmplyees?
Politics, Taxes, and the Limits of the InternalRevenue Seice'sAuthority Over Employment Classification,
8 ADMIN. U. AM. U. 371, 391-401 (1994) (discussing range of tax issues raised by classifying
campaign workers as independent contractors versus employees); Matthew J. Rita, Fishingfor
Dollars: The IRS Changes Course in ClassfyingFshermenfor Employment Tax Purposes,77 CORNELL
L. REv. 393,415-38 (1992) (examining recent debate regarding how captains and crew members
of fishing boats should be classified).
153. I.R.C. § 7501 (1988).
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The amounts are generally referred to as trust fund taxes."5 4 When
businesses have delinquent bills from creditors and are facing a cash
crunch, the owners often use trust fund taxes to pay the current
business creditors instead of forwarding them to the U.S. Treasury. 55 Not uncommonly, the owners convince themselves that
their economic problems are temporary, and by the time they hear
from the IRS, they will have had time to improve their cash flow and
pay their tax debt. 5 '
This "unauthorized borrowing" poses a
serious, though not unfamiliar, threat to the collection of social
security taxes. 57
Under § 6672(a), any person responsible for collection and
payment of trust fund taxes who willfully fails to pay them is subject
to a penalty equal to 100% of the trust fund taxes.5 " The purpose
of this penalty (sometimes referred to as "the 100% penalty" or the
"responsible person" penalty) is to encourage payment of the trust
fund taxes when due, and to discourage the use of trust fund taxes
for other business needs.' 59 When these taxes are not paid, § 6672
provides the Government with a secondarily liable target.'l
The
responsible person penalty is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 6 '
In Jones v. United States, 6 2 the Federal Circuit held that a taxpayer,
who was one of three partners in a construction partnership, was a
responsible person within the meaning of § 6672 and, thus, liable for
the 100% penalty on unpaid trust fund taxes." Although another
partner had primarily handled the financial aspects of the operation,
the court held that Jones could also be held liable for the penalty
because he was an active participant in the business and, among other
things, had authority to write checks to pay partnership debts. 6
154. See Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1993) (attributing "trust fund
tax" nomenclature to employer's obligation to withhold income tax).
155. Id.
156. ki.
157. SeeJames C. Seiffert, IRS's New Approach to Determining "Responsible"Personsfor the 100%
Penalty, 79J. TAX'N 144, 145 (1993) (discussing problems of trust fund misappropriations).
158. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1988).
159. See Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(interpreting I.RLC. § 6672 as requiring "full amount" penalty for person failing to withhold
employees' withholding taxes).
160. I.R.C. § 6672 (1988). Specifically, the statute provides that the "responsible person"
shall "be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not
accounted for and paid over." I. § 6672(a).
161. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), 523(a)(7) (1988).
162. No. 94-5041, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10400 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 1994).
163. Jones v. United States, No. 94-5041, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10400, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May
9, 1994).
164.
i. Jones argued that only the partner who controlled the financial aspects of the
business should be liable for nonpayment of taxes. I/.The court, however, emphasized that
more than one person can be held liable under § 6672. Id.
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The court noted that Jones had attended meetings where nonpayment of trust fund taxes was discussed and participated in the
decision to use the trust fund taxes for other partnership purposes. " The court stated that more than one person could be held
liable under § 6672 for nonpayment of trust fund taxes. 16 The
standard set forth by the court was whether a person "had the power
to control the decision-making process by which the partnership
decided to meet its debts to other creditors at the Government's
expense." 6 7
The Federal Circuit's decision in Jones is consistent with the broad
approach courts have taken toward liability for the 100% penalty.
Courts have found anyone who had control over business finances to
be liable, including anyone with decisional authority over which bills
should be paid."~ This case demonstrated that, although others
may be more culpable, a relatively innocent person can nonetheless
be held a responsible person subject to the same exposure and
liability as the more responsible actor.

VII.

STOCK REPURCHASE PREMIUMS NONDEDUCTIBLE

Lane Bryant, Inc. (Lane), a subsidiary of The Limited, Inc., was the
subject of a potential hostile takeover by two shareholders.1 69 Over
a fifteen-month period, the two shareholders acquired approximately
In 1981, Lane entered into
twenty percent of Lane's stock.'
negotiated repurchase agreements with both shareholders to buy back

165. IL
166. IdL
167. 1&
168. Se, ag., Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
responsibility for raising capital, check-signing authority, and general financial involvement were
sufficient evidence of responsibility for imposition of liability for nonpayment of taxes);
Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12, 16-17 (Ist Cir. 1989) (finding that defendant, although
not stockholder, was responsible person because of his authority to issue checks, access to
company books and records, and joint authority to order payment of taxes); Brown v. United
States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding both corporate partners liable for
nonpayment of taxes because both had check-writing authority); Datlofv. United States, 252 F.
Supp. 11, 32 (E.D. Pa.) (holding defendant liable as responsible person based on his checksigning ability, role in employee hiring and firing, signature on tax returns, and general control
over business affairs), aff'd, 370 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denie(d 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
Responsible persons have also been held liable for interest on unpaid trust fund taxes. See
Turchon v. United States, 77 B.R. 398, 401 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987), afld sub nom. In reTurchon,
841 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that liability under § 6672, although deemed penalty, is
in fact tax that includes interest, making employer liable for interest on unpaid taxes). See
generally MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 55.125 to .126 (1989) (discussing trust
fund tax liability).
169. Lane Bryant, Inc. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1570, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
170. l& at 1572.
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their stock at a premium above the stock's trading value.'
The
amount of the premium in one of the agreements was $5.00 per
share.'72 In the other, it was $5.50 per share.'
The repurchase
agreements also contained nonstock terms, such as the cessation of
present and future litigation, payment of transfer taxes, warranties of
authorization and title, and waiver of dividend rights. 74 There was
no allocation of the monetary consideration in the agreements
between the stock and nonstock items-all references to the monetary
consideration were in the clauses involving the stock sale.'75
The tax significance of these events occurred when Lane reported
a $5.3 million deduction, representing the amount of its repurchase
premiums, on its 1981 federal income tax return. 17 Lane claimed
that the premium payments represented compensation for nonstock
items, rather than stock, and therefore were deductible as "ordinary
and necessary business expense[s]" under the Code. 17 7 The Government's view, on the other hand, was that, for tax purposes, the
total consideration paid should be treated as the cost of the repurchased stock,7" a nondeductible capital expenditure under
§ 162(k). 79
The Claims Court found for the Government, concluding that
neither repurchase agreement allocated consideration to the nonstock
8
items and that the language of the agreements was controlling. 0
In reaching its conclusion, the court declined to recognize the
asserted intent of the parties-that the premium paid for the stock
above its market value was in consideration for the
nonstock
provisions.181 The court relied on the Danielson rule 8 2 as well as
its own precedent in Stokely-Van Camp Inc. v. United States,"ta for the

proposition that parties to a written and duly executed agreement are

17i.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

181.

I.
Id.
hX

I.
Id

Id
hM (citing I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988)).
Id. at 1573.
See I.R.C. § 162(k) (1988).
Lane Byant, 35 F.3d at 1573.

Id. (noting that Claims Court read agreement as allocating entire purchase price to

stock redemption).
182. See Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (holding that

party can challenge tax consequences of agreement only by proof of contract's unenforceability
due to mistake, fraud, undue influence, duress, etc.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
183. 974 F.2d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that Danielson rule governs stock
repurchase agreements containing express allocations of monetary consideration between stock
and non-stock items).
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bound, for tax purposes, by the characterizations they make of items
in the agreement. 184 Because the Lane repurchase agreements did
not allocate any monetary consideration to the nonstock provisions,
and all references to the financial consideration for the deals were in
the clauses regarding the stock sales, the Claims Court made a factual
finding that the repurchase agreements contained an express
1
allocation of all of the monetary consideration to the stock items. 9
Applying Danielson, the court found that the taxpayers were legally
bound by that finding and, thus, liable for tax payments on the entire
amount of the repurchase price.'8
The Federal Circuit affirmed this holding.187 In response to the
taxpayer's argument that interpreting the repurchase agreements as
allocating nothing to the nonstock provisions was illogical and flew in
the face of economic sense, the court stated that the Danielsonrule
was an appropriate rule of construction with respect to the tax
consequences of private agreements. Additionally, the court stated
that the Danielson rule prevented the "whipsaw of later inconsistent
positions" at the expense of the Government when the parties who
drafted the agreement later took tax positions contrary to its
1
language. 88
The Federal Circuit's decision is consistent with a long line of
decisions holding that, while the Government is free in any case to
challenge the form of a transaction as inconsistent with its true
economic substance,18 9 the taxpayer is bound by the form chosen
in the transaction and may not later disavow that form.19°

184.
185.
186.

Lane Bjyant, 35 F.3d at 1574-75.
See id. at 1575.
Id. at 1576.

187. Id.
188.
189.

Id.
SrA e.g., Spector v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.) (stating that IRS will not

be bound by secret, unilateral, subjective allocation of purchase price that is not expressed in
agreement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1007 (3d
Cir. 1980) (holding taxpayers' liability is determined by transaction's form).
190. See, e.g., Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148
(1974) (observing that while taxpayers are free to organize affhirs as they choose, they must
accept consequences of that choice); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (stating
that tax consequences must turn upon economic substance of transaction rather than timing
or transaction form);Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1195 (5th Cir.
1970) (stating that form and substance of transaction determine whether recognition of
transaction form would undermine relevant tax position), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
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VIII. ATrORNES' FEES
In Sharp v. United States,'9 1 the taxpayer sought an award of

attorneys' fees after defeating the Government in a case involving the
carryover of investment interest 9 2 under § 163(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Under § 7430 of the Code"M a taxpayer may be
awarded attorneys' fees if she is a prevailing party and the
Government's position in the underlying action is not substantially
justified.'95 Section 7430 was enacted as part of the Tax Equity and
Financial Responsibility Act of 1982.196 The Act's purpose was to
permit courts to award attorneys' fees to successful tax litigants in
cases where the Government has adopted an unreasonable trial
197
position.

In Sharp, the taxpayer argued not only that the Government's
position was unreasonable, but also that by the time the Government
brought the appeal in his case it had previously lost the identical issue
in the Fourth Circuit," in a District court case,' and in the
Court of Federal Claims.2°' Furthermore, after the taxpayer filed
his appeal in this case, the Tax Court had reversed itself and decided
20
the issue adversely to the Government. '
In a divided decision, the Federal Circuit denied the award. 20 2
The court stated that while a string of losses can evidence an
unreasonable position, the Government's loss of an issue in one
circuit does not render its choice to relitigate that issue as one

191. 20 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
192. Sharp v. United States, 20 F.2d 1153, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
193. I.R.C. § 163(d) (1988). Section 163 allows taxpayers to deduct interest paid or accrued
in the current tax year and permits taxpayers to carryover unused investment interest
deductions. Id.
194. I.R.C. § 7430 (1988). Section 7430 permits the prevailing party to recover reasonable
litigation costs in court proceedings brought by or against the United States. Id.
195. I.R.C. § 7430(c) (9) (1988).
196. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(a), 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified at I.RC. § 7430 (1988)).
197. See Sharp, 20 F.3d at 1154.
198. I&at 1155; seeBeyer v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
tax code's carry-over provision applies regardless of taxpayer's total taxable income for year).
199. See Flood v. United States, 845 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (D. Alaska 1993) (holding that
taxpayer may carry forward investment interest in excess of investment income).
200. See Sharp v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 52, 57 (1992) (stating that clear and undisputed
meaning of§ 163 allows taxpayers to deduct interest paid or accrued in current tax year without
limitation).
201. See Lenz v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 260, 270 (1993) (holding that carryover of
investment interest expense under § 163(d) is not limited by taxpayer's taxable income in
current year).
202. Sharp v. United States, 20 F.3d 1153, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (refusing to find
Government's position substantially unjustified where at least one court had agreed with
Government).
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without substantial justification.0 3 Moreover, the Government had
successfully litigated the issue before the Tax Court, °4 even though
the Fourth Circuit ultimately overruled that court.2 5 As a result,
Sharp did not prove that the Government's position was substantially
unjustified and no attorneys' fees were awarded.2°
Judge Newman, in an angry dissent, argued that attorneys' fees
should have been allowed. 2 7 Newman's opinion cited a statement
given by Government's counsel at oral argument that the Government
would continue to litigate the same issue until it had lost in at least
six circuits. 2 8 The taxpayer, Newman stated, should not have to pay

for the Government's search for a receptive forum. 0 9
The majority opinion in the Sharp case stands in contrast to the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Alibritton v. Commissioner.2 " After ruling
in favor of the taxpayer on the same underlying issue, the court in
Alibrittonrebuked the Government for forum shopping and invited the
taxpayer to apply for attorneys' fees under § 7430.1
IX.

TORT LIAEILITY SETTLEMENT FUNDS

In Maxus Energy Corporationv. United States,21 2 the taxpayer was the
parent corporation in an affiliated group of corporations (Group)
that filed its tax returns on a consolidated basis, using the accrual
method of accounting. 2 3 One corporate member of the group,
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Corporation, was a manufacturer of
Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant used in the Vietnam War.214
In 1984, Diamond settled claims brought by a class of Vietnam

203. Id. at 1154.
204. Beyer v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1304 (1989) (holding that carry-over provision issubject
to implicit limitation equal to taxpayer's total taxable income for year), rev'd, 916 F.2d 153 (4th
Cir. 1990).
205. Beyer v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that carry-over
provision is not subject to limitation equal to taxpayer's total taxable income for year).
206. Sharp, 20 F.3d at 1154.
207. Id. at 1155 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that whether Government wins or loses,
fundamental fairness precludes requiring successive taxpayers to bear litigation costs).
208. Id. (Newman,J., dissenting).
209. Ild. (Newman,J., dissenting).
210. 37 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 1994).
211. Allbritton v. Commissioner, 37 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit found
that the Government's appeal, based on a statutory interpretation previously rejected by the
Fourth Circuit, the Federal Circuit and several district courts, constituted forum shopping at the
taxpayer's expense and was not substantially justified; and held that the Commissioner should
bear all reasonable costs of the taxpayer's litigation. Id.
212. 31 F.3d 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
213. Maxus Energy Corp. v. United States, 31 F.3d 1135, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
214. Id.
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veterans for injuries resulting from the veterans' exposure to Agent
2 15
Orange.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Diamond agreed to pay
$21.7 million plus interest (out of a total $180 million settlement) to
a court-administered fund from which individual plaintiffs would be
compensated.1
The agreement, with which Diamond complied,
required Diamond, to transfer a letter of credit, bond or other
acceptable security to secure its payment of the settlement amount by
July 2, 1984.217 Although Diamond had an option to withdraw from
the settlement until July 19, 1984, it did not do so. 2 1 On January
9
14, 1985 Diamond paid $23,339,417 to the fund.21
The Group deducted the bulk of the settlement amount,
$23,254,217, which accrued in 1984; and the residual portion,
$85,200, which accrued in 1985.220 Portions of the deduction were
carried back and applied against the Group's 1972-75 tax years. 221
At issue before the Federal Circuit was the correct year of the
deduction of the settlement liability.21

The Government chal-

lenged the taxpayer's right to claim the deduction in either 1984 or
1985.22

After holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal,224
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Government as to the deductions
claimed in 1984, and determined that the Group was not entitled to
claim any part of the deduction in that year.2 Prior to enactment
of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the general rule was that accrual
method taxpayers were entitled to claim a deduction, whether or not
they had paid the amount, if all events had occurred that fixed the
amount and fact of the underlying liability.226 Where a liability was
contingent or contested, the deduction was not available until the
liability became fixed and certain unless it had actually been paid. 227
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
I.
Id.
Id.
I&
Id.

221. Id. Pursuant to the tax code, deductions for settlement proceeds are product liability
losses. These losses can be carried back to each of the preceding 10 taxable years. As a result,
taxpayers can amend their returns and apply a portion of their settlements as deductions for
each of the preceding years. I.R.C. § 172(b) (1) (I) (1988).
222. Maxus EnerV, 31 F.3d at 1142.
223. Id. (arguing that Maxus was not entitled to deduction because all events surrounding
settlement had not yet occurred).
224. Id. at 1139.
225. Id. at 1142.

226. I.R.C. § 461 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i) (1984).
227. I.R.C. § 461(f) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2 (1984).
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For the tax year 1984, the court found that the "all events" test was
met on July 19, when the Group's option to withdraw from the
settlement expired.228 Under the all events test, the deduction
would normally have been allowed at that time.229 Just a few weeks
earlier, however, Congress had enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
which contained an amended § 461(h) . 21 That section provides
that an accrual basis taxpayer cannot deduct an accrued expense,
even if the "all events" test has been met, unless economic performance has occurred with respect to the item. 2 1 Insofar as tort
liabilities are concerned, the court held that economic performance
occurs when there is an actual payment of the liability.2 2 Because
was
Diamond made no actual payment in 1984, no deduction
2
allowable for that year under the economic performance test. 1
In 1985, Diamond did make a payment to the fund.2M With
respect to the 1985 tax year, however, the Government challenged the
deduction on the ground that the fund was a designated settlement
fund within the meaning of § 468B; and that no deductions were
permissible until disbursement to the individual claimants had
occurred.2s Under § 468B the economic performance requirement
of § 461(h) is met when "qualified payments" are made into a
"designated settlement fund (DSF)."236 A DSF is a fund created
pursuant to a court order which completely extinguishes the
taxpayers' tort liability with respect to claims arising out of personal
injury, death, or property damage, and which meets certain other
view, Diamond had not met
requirements. 8 7 In the Government's
2
the economic performance test. 1
The Federal Circuit allowed the taxpayer a deduction of
$23,339,417 for 1985.29 The court stated that in 1985 the Group's
liability to the individual claimants had merged with its liability to the
24 °
settlement fund, as established by the settlement agreement
Diamond could not be held liable in the future for additional

228. MaxusEnergy, 31 F.3d at 1142.
229. I.
230. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 468B (1988)).
231. Maxus Energy, 31 F.3d at 1143.
232. Id. at 1142.
233. Id. at 1143.
234. d.
235. I&
236. Id.
237. Id. at n.22
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1144.
240. Id. at 1143.
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amounts to claimants beyond the amount for which it was already
liable. 24' Therefore, payment had been made to the "person" to
whom Diamond was liable.21 Because the Group's obligation to the
injured class had been effectively discharged by the January 14, 1985
payment, the court concluded that economic performance had
occurred. 243 The court further held that § 468B did not apply to
the case.

244

The question of the tax treatment of potentially responsible parties
(PRPs), with respect to settlement fund payments, is currently of keen
interest to the IRS. The IRS is principally concerned with the
deductibility of payments to these funds, and the subsequent tax
treatment of income earned on them. Section 468B, which deals with
designated settlement funds, was enacted in 1986 as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.21 Section 468B provides that qualified payments to a designated settlement fund, which extinguish a taxpayer's
tort liability, constitute economic performance with respect to that
liability.24

Thus, an accrual basis taxpayer may deduct qualified

payments to a fund in the year those payments are made.
Section 468B and the IRS are focusing on environmental cleanup
funds under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).247 In many cases, the PRPs
making contributions to an environmental settlement fund will
remain liable for additional payments if earlier deposits into the fund
are insufficient to complete the cleanup.' 4 In order for PRPs to
claim immediate deductions for contributions made into the fund,
the IRS requires the249PRPs to receive a release from the Environmental
Protection Agency.

At the 1994 annual meeting of the American Bar Association's Tax
Section, an IRS spokesperson described the Federal Circuit's decision
241.
242.
243.

Id.at 1144.
Id.
Id. at 1145.

244. Id. at 1144. The court found that because the settlement in this case is of a contested
liability within the express terms of I.R.C. § 461(0, the provisions of § 468B are inapplicable.
Id.
245. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at I.RIC. § 468B
(1988)).
246. I.R.C. § 468B (1988). Specifically, § 468B states that "economic performance shall be
deemed to occur as qualified payments are made by the taxpayer to a designated settlement
fund." Id.
247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
248. See Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 15 (E.D. Md. 1985)
(discussing liability of defendants releasing hazardous waste under CERCLA).
249. See Ellen Rosenthal, IRS, EnvironmentalTaxPrarlitioners Debate Timing, ClassificationIssues
of Settlement Funds, 94 TNT 158-67 (Aug. 12, 1994) (discussing tax treatment of environmental
settlements, and timing of deductions for contributions to those funds).
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in Maxus Energy as "a little problematic" and "troubling" under
§ 461(h) because the deduction was allowed even though the fund
was a contested liability fund.20
X.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Arkla sold natural gas which it maintained in the Chiles Dome
Reservoir, a natural underground reservoir."' Arkla determined
that in order to maintain sufficient pressure in the reservoir to
retrieve the gas, it needed at least 14 billion cubic feet (BCF) 2of
"cushion gas," which creates the necessary pressure for pumping. 5 2
Some of the cushion gas was recoverable and some was nonrecoverable.253
The IRS allowed Arkla to claim an investment tax credit (ITC) for
the cost of the nonrecoverable portion of the gas on its 1980 tax
return.2
Subsequently, Arkla filed an amended return, claiming
an additional ITC for the recoverable portion of the cushion gas, and
seeking a tax refund. m5 The IRS did not respond favorably to the
claim, and Arkla brought a refund suit in the District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana. 6 The district court held for Arkla,
but the Fifth Circuit reversed, 7 holding that the recoverable gas
was not depreciable and did not qualify for an ITC because it did not
have a measurable useful life. The gas would remain physically
unchanged in the well for the indefinite future, and could be recovered and sold when Arkla closed the reservoir."8
Arkla again claimed an ITC for cushion gas in the 1981 tax year, as
well as a depreciation deduction under the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS)." Arkla also claimed similar deductions and credits
for gas purchases on its 1982, 1983, and 1984 returns.2 ° The IRS

250. Id
251. Arkla, Inc. v. United States, 32 F.$d 621, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
252. Id.
253. Id. Both recoverable and nonrecoverable cushion gas serve the same function in
operating a gas storage facility, but only recoverable cushion gas can be economically withdrawn
from the reservoir and sold upon abandonment of the facility. Id.
254. I. at 622-23.
255. Id. at 623.
256. Id.
257. Arkla, Inc. v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. La. 1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 487 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied; 475 U.S. 1064 (1986).
258. Arkla, 32 .3d at 623 (concluding that I.R.C. § 48(a) (1) required gas to be depreciable
capital asset and have useful life of more than three years in order to qualify for investment tax
credit).
259. Id. at 623.
260. Id
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disallowed each of these deductions and credits. 26 ' Because Arkla
had lost the issue for its 1980 return in the Fifth Circuit, it brought
2 62
suit with respect to the 1981-84 years in the Claims Court.
The Claims Court relied on collateral estoppel in holding for the
Government and the Federal Circuit affirmed, 21 stating that collateral estoppel barred Arkla from relitigating the issues presented to the
Fifth Circuit because the law and material facts were identical in both
cases, despite the fact that the subsequent Federal Circuit case
involved different tax years.&
The Federal Circuit's decision is consistent with those of other
courts that have invoked collateral estoppel to prevent repeated
litigation of the same issues.2 6 Where there has been a significant
intervening change with respect to the legal basis of an earlier
decision, such as a Supreme Court decision, collateral estoppel is
inapplicable. 2 ' Although the taxpayer in this case argued that legal
principles had changed since the earlier judgment had been handed
down,2 67 the Federal Circuit concluded that the Fifth Circuit had
completely addressed the issue and held that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel applied.2 6
XI.

FOREIGN TAX CREDIT

Under British law, a resident corporation must pay an Advance
26 9
Corporate Tax (ACT) on qualifying shareholder distributions.
Unlike the United States, which imposes double taxes on corporate
income, the U.K. has an "integrated system" with dividend relief, but
imposes an advance corporate tax on distributions to insure that the
tax is paid at least once. 270 The corporation may use its ACT
payments to offset its mainstream corporate tax, but the ACT is
27
payable whether or not the corporation has turned a profit. '

261. ML
262. Id.
263. Id. at 625.
264. Id.
265. See Lea, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 762, 770 (1978) (stating that taxpayers are
collaterally estopped from relitigating issues when controlling facts and legal principles are
same).
266. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948) (holding collateral estoppel
inapplicable where legal principles have significantly changed since judgment of same issue
under identical facts in earlier case).
267. Arkla v. United States, 37 F.3d 621, 625 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
268. Id.
269. See Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 649 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
270. See id. at 649-50 (discussing corporate taxation in United Kingdom).
271. Id.
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While the tax is nonrefundable,
it is subject to a two-year carryback
272
and unlimited carryforward.
Rank Xerox, Ltd. (RXL) is a British corporation, the majority of
whose stock is owned by Xerox Corporation (Xerox), a United States
corporation. 2' In 1974, RXL distributed dividends to Xerox and
paid ACT tax on the distributions, as required by British law.274
RXL used part of its ACT payments to offset 1974 corporation income
taxes owed to the United Kingdom.2 75 Xerox claimed a foreign tax
credit in 1974 for its ACT payments to offset its U.S. tax, pursuant to
the United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty (U.S.-U.K. Tax
Treaty) .276 This treaty permits U.S. companies to claim foreign tax
credits for ACT payments made to the U.K. in order to eliminate
double taxation on earnings of a U.K. company.27 7
In 1980, RXL surrendered its unused ACT carryforwards to its
British subsidiaries, a transaction specifically permitted under British
law. 78 Once RXL did so, however, the IRS concluded that Xerox
should not have been allowed to claim 1974 foreign tax credits with
respect to the surrendered carryforwards, and sought additional taxes
from Xerox in connection with the company's 1974 dividend
income.2 79
Xerox paid the additional tax and brought a refund suit in the
Claims Court, which denied Xerox's claim.2 ' The Federal Circuit,
however, in a holding that may cost the Government millions of
dollars in tax revenues, reversed the Claims Court and allowed the
foreign tax credit to Xerox. 21 The court held that, under the U.S.U.K. Tax Treaty, the ACT is fully creditable by a U.S. company when
paid or accrued in the United Kingdom. 82 As a consequence,
RXL's subsequent surrender of its ACT carryforwards to its British
subsidiaries (and thereby the right to offset the ACT against future
corporation income) did not reduce the foreign tax credit available
to its U.S. shareholders.2 8

272.
273.

Id.
Id. at 649.

274. Id.
275.

Id.

276. Id.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.

279. Id.
280.

Id.

281.

Id. at 660.

282.

Id.

283. Id.
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The Government argued that the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty permits the
United States to withdraw the foreign tax credit if the ACT is not set
off against the British company's U.K. mainstream corporation
tax.284 The Federal Circuit, however, held that the allowance of the
foreign tax credit under the treaty was not so limited. Xerox was
therefore entitled to the credit in 1974, when RXL distributed
Once Xerox
dividends and paid ACT on those distributions.t
became entitled to the credit, it was not defeasible based on whether
or how RXL applied the ACT offset, or whether RXL had surrendered its rights to its subsidiaries under British law.28 6
The IRS may well decide to appeal the Federal Circuit's decision to
the U.S. Supreme Court because of the amount of revenue involved.
The problem the Government will face in getting a grant of certiorari
is the lack of conflict among the circuits regarding the status of the
Act and the foreign tax credit.

XII.

PUERTO RICAN WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT INVALID

In 1988, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the Puerto Rican
Government entered into an agreement28 allowing the United
States to withhold Puerto Rican income tax from the wages of federal
employees working in Puerto Rico. 21 In 1989, a class of employees
brought suit against the United States in the District Court of Puerto
Rico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and back pay in the
amount they alleged was unlawfully withheld. 8 9
The district court found the agreement valid, and the employees
appealed to the First Circuit. 21 Without rendering a decision, the
First Circuit determined that the employees' claims were non-frivolous
and, pursuant to the Little Tucker Act,29' transferred the case to the
Federal Circuit.292
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the
case,29 stating that 5 U.S.C. § 5517(c) authorized the Secretary of
284. Id. at 652.
285. Id. at 660.
286. Id.
287. See Romero v. United States, 38 F.3d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (granting Secretary
of Treasury power to enter into federal withholding tax agreements with states). This agreement
was entered into under 5 U.S.C. § 5517 (1994). Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1207.
290. Id.
291. Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1988) (stating that where district court's
jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on non-frivolous claim, exclusive jurisdiction of appeal
lies in that court).
292. Romero, 38 F.3d at 1207.
293. Id. at 1212.
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the Treasury to enter into withholding agreements only with states,
territories, or possessions of the United States. 29 Puerto Rico, a
Commonwealth, is none of these.2 9 Accordingly, the court held the
withholding agreement unlawful and void. 96
With respect to the employees' action for back pay, the court
declined to hold the United States liable for monies previously given
to Puerto Rico under the withholding agreement.2 97 It did, however, order the United States to refund withheld funds that had not yet
been paid to Puerto Rico. 9 8
XIII.

VALUATION

The Federal Circuit was called upon to decide a valuation dispute
Hearst involved a charitable
in Hearst Corp. v. United States.2'
contribution made by the Hearst Metrotone News Film Library to the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) in four installments-one each in 1981 and 1982, and two in 19 8 5. 300 Hearst
claimed $62,000,080 in tax deductions for these years. The IRS,
however, valued the gift at only $1,847,844-more than $60 million
less than Hearst's figure. 0 '
Both the taxpayer and the Government utilized two expert witnesses
to estimate the value of the gift.1°2 The Claims Court found no
expert persuasive, however, for reasons including what the court saw
as reliance on noncomparable sales and highly speculative and
optimistic assumptions. 03 The Claims Court also determined that all
four gifts were part of a single donative plan, and that, under the step
transaction doctrine 3 4 all four gifts should be treated as a single
transaction valued on the date of the first transfer, December 2,
1981.05 The Claims Court then determined that because the IRS'
valuation was presumptively correct, and the taxpayer had failed

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1210.
297. Id. at 1212.
298. IM.
299. No. 93-5160, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25788 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
300. Hearst Corp. v. United States, No. 93-5160, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25788, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
301. Id.

302. Id. at *3-4.
303. Ie. at *5.
304. See King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511,516 (Ct. CI. 1969) (characterizing
step transaction as integrated transaction not broken into independent steps when attaching tax
consequences).
305. Hearst Cop., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25788, at *5.
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through its experts to rebut the presumption, the asserted deficiency
should be upheld."'
The Federal Circuit reversed.0 7 Unlike the Claims Court, the
Federal Circuit found that the transactions in issue were distinct
transactions and thus, the Claims Court should have considered the
four valuation dates."' The Federal Circuit also disagreed with the
Government's attempt to characterize the step transaction approach
applied by the Claims Court as harmless error."° It stated that the
Claims Court had rejected the taxpayer's experts for a variety of
reasons, including the fact that the experts had considered market
events after 198110

The Federal Circuit stated that the step

transaction approach utilized by the Claims Court "infected the trial
court's view of the case in all aspects."31 Accordingly, the only
appropriate disposition was to remand the case for reconsideration
based on a valuation in accordance with the court's opinion.-12
CONCLUSION

In 1994, the Government prevailed in twelve tax cases and the
taxpayers in four. If the scorecard were kept in terms of numbers of
wins and losses, it was a good year for the Government. On the other
hand, if the measure of governmental success in 1994 is dollar
amounts won and lost, the Government fared significantly less well in
1994. Between Xerox, Romero, and Hearst, taxpayers were successful in
keeping hundreds of millions of dollars out of the Government's
hands. In addition, Maxus Energy may pose significant future
problems for the Government with respect to the deductibility of
large environmental settlement contributions. As in prior years, the
Federal Circuit can certainly be said to have left its mark on the
development of the tax law.

306. Id.
307. Id. at *8.
308. Id. at *12.
309. Id. at *9.
310. Id. at *11.
311. Id. at *12.
312. Id.

